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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
presumption of an intention to forgive and continue the rela-
tionship. The conclusion that must be drawn from all the facts
is that the offended spouse intended to forgive the other spouse
and to renew or continue the marital relation. Thus, where a
single act of sexual intercourse is engaged in, and the facts show
that the offended spouse never intended to continue the marital
situation, there should not be an extinguishment of the action for
separation based on reconciliation of the parties.
Cary G. deBessonet
JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM OVER NONRESIDENT CORPORATIONS
A Louisiana resident injured while employed on an oil rig
in the Persian Gulf brought a workmen's compensation action
against his employers, several Panamanian oil corporations, in
a Louisiana court. The oil companies had recruited employees,
including the plaintiff, in Louisiana to work on an oil rig built
and repaired in Louisiana for operation in the Persian Gulf;
but the companies had neither qualified to do business in Lou-
isiana nor consented to be sued there. The trial court sustained
defendants' exceptions to its jurisdiction in personam. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Held, defendants'
"business activity" within Louisiana had been sufficient to give
the state's courts jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:3471 (1) ex-
tending Louisiana's personal jurisdiction over nonresident cor-
porations. Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Co., 170 So. 2d
518 La. App. 3d Cir. (1965), writs refused: "The ruling on the
plea to the jurisdiction in personam is correct." 247 La. 613,
614, 615, 172 So. 2d 700, appeal dismissed for want of a sub-
stantial federal question, 382 U.S. 16.1
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that a state could, without violating
due process, require a foreign corporation to defend a suit in
its courts if the corporation had sufficient minimum contacts
with the state so that maintenance of the suit would not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ' 3 The
1. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term -
Civil Procedure, 26 LA. L. REV. 581 (1966).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Student Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction, 26
LA. L. REV. 350, 361, 391 (1966).
3. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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court reasoned that if the corporation exercised the privilege of
transacting business within the state, enjoying the benefits and
protection of its laws, it should be subject to the corresponding
obligation of defending in that state suits arising out of its
activity.4 It was implied in that decision that a single act might
constitute a sufficient contact., Precisely that situation faced
the Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co." In upholding
state jurisdiction over a foreign insurance corporation that
had issued a single reinsurance contract through the mails to
one resident, the Court emphasized the connections between the
single business act and the state: delivery of the policy in the
state, mailing of premiums from the state, the residence of the
insured in the forum state at his death.7 The Court also stressed
the state's interest in providing a forum for its residents to
assert their claims against reluctant foreign insurers, observing
that to force the insured and his witnesses to pursue the in-
surer to its home state would in effect deny the claimant his
legal remedy, and concluding that the relative inconvenience to
the insurer in defending an action in the forum state was not
a denial of due process.8
But the Court has insisted that convenience alone is insuf-
ficient basis for jurisdiction. In Hansen v. Denckla,9 the Court
found insufficient contacts where a trust settlor had moved to
the forum state after creating the trust, and the trust company
had mailed income checks and other communications to her
there. The Court stated: "It is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails him-
self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."10
Only after such contacts are established is convenience of the
forum a proper consideration."1
As the Supreme Court broadened the area of possible state
exercise of personal jurisdiction, the Louisiana legislature re-
4. Id. at 319.
5. Id. at 318.
6. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See Student Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction, 26
LA. L. REV. 350, 392 (1966).
7. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
8. Ibid.
9. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See Student Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction, 26
LA. L. REV. 350, 393 (1966).
10. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
11. Id. at 250.
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sponded, broadening the statutes relating to personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresident corporations. In 1950 the Louisiana stat-
ute providing for service of process on foreign corporations 1 2
was amended in the light of International Shoe to provide for
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the corporation
"has engaged in business activities in this State through acts
performed by its employees or agents in this State,"'Is in all
causes of action resulting from these acts. But the expansion
was not so great as originally supposed. The courts found them-
selves restricted by two phrases: "engaged in business activ-
ities," and "performed by its employees or agents." Because
the plural "activities" was used, the courts required intrastate
activity of a continuous nature,14 and because the statute speci-
fied "employees or agents," jurisdiction was denied for failure
to discover an employee or agency relationship. 5
To take advantage of the latitude afforded by McGee16 the
Louisiana statute was again amended in 1960. Now appearing
as La. R.S. 13:3471 (1), the statute grants jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation that has "engaged in a business activity in
this state"'7 on a cause of action resulting from that activity.
The requirements that the business activities be continuous and
systematic or performed in Louisiana by a corporation's em-
ployees or agents are eliminated. It was under this 1960 amend-
ment and against the background of Denckla, McGee, and In-
ternational Shoe that the instant case arose.
Because the question of sufficiency of the business activity
for personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporations is one
of law and fact which must be determined on the circumstances
of each case,' the instant case turned primarily on interpreta-
tion of the facts. The facts must therefore be set forth with
some detail.' 9
The recruitment of employees began when the defendants
advertised in a Louisiana paper for workers to report to a Lou-
12. LA. R.S. 13:3471(5) (d) (1950).
13. Ibid.
14. See Johnson v. El Dorado Creosoting Co., 71 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1954).
15. See Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959).
16. See Explanatory Note, LA. R.S. ANN. 13:3471 (West, Supp. 1965).
17. LA. R.S. 13:3471(1) (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960. No. 32, § 1.
18. See Nigro v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 169 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
19. Although the instant case involved other defendants and other issues, this
Note is limited to the issue of in personam jurisdiction, and only those facts rel-
evant to that issue are set forth.
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isiana motel for interviews. During the three days of interviews
at the motel, defendants' agent took plaintiff's application and
placed it in a potential employee pool from which they and
other companies could draw as the need arose. Defendants later
selected plaintiff from the pool and notified him to report to
Dallas, Texas, where he received his employment contract.
Plaintiff executed the contract in Louisiana, and mailed it to
Texas. After plaintiff had reported, as ordered, to certain New
Orleans physicians for a physical examination and overseas in-
oculation, defendants completed the contract in Texas and
mailed it to plaintiff along with a travel allowance, passport,
plane ticket, and itinerary for the trip to defendants' oil field
in Kuwait. Plaintiff flew to Kuwait from New Orleans. Ten
days later he was injured in Kuwait, and promptly returned
to Louisiana. Defendants also hired other Louisiana. workmen
as a result of the Louisiana activity.
It was disputed whether defendants maintained an office
in Texas, or only in Kuwait; it was also disputed whether plain-
tiff's pay commenced after his physical examination in New
Orleans, but it was certain that the pay commenced at least on
the day of his departure.
Defendants asserted that to meet the minimum contracts
test the activities of the nonresident must be both continuous
and systematic rather than sporadic or non-recurring. The Lou-
isiana cases supporting this defense, 20 however, had been de-
cided prior to the 1960 amendment of La. R.S. 13:3471 (1).
Other cases were distinguished as having been decided under
the old test of "doing business. ' 21 The court stressed that under
the McGee liberalization of personal jurisdiction which was em-
bodied in the 1960 act, all that is necessary to meet the require-
ment of minimum contact is "a business activity" in the state.
It is no longer necessary to discover activities of a continuing
and systematic nature.
Judge Tate, for the majority, reasoned that although de-
fendants had merely participated by financial support in the
creation of an employee pool from which many companies could
draw, the practical effect of the hiring practices was the same
20. Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Wyss
v. Good Hope Placers, Inc., 106 So. 2d 10 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
21. See cases cited at 170 So. 2d 518, 526, 527. See generally Student Sym-
posium, Personal Jurisdiction, 26 LA. L. REV. 350 (1966).
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as though defendants had personally come into Louisiana to
advertise, and to interview and select plaintiff for their Kuwait
operations. Since they had voluntarily and purposefully taken
advantage of the benefits and protection of the laws of Louisi-
ana in their recruiting activities, it became their consequent
duty to answer suits in Louisiana courts enforcing obligations
arising out of or connected with those activities. Judge Tate
forcefully described Louisiana's interest in providing a forum
for plaintiff by noting that after plaintiff's injury he was re-
turned home "now crippled and in need of medical attention,
possibly a charge upon the public of Louisiana unless he can
effectively pursue his compensation remedy. '2 2 The majority
therefore felt that the contacts as well as the resulting relation-
ship between the defendant corporations and the state were
sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the minimum contacts
test. In considering Hanson v. Denckla, not only did the court
find greater contacts than in Denckla, but found that the facts
met the test laid down in Denckla: the defendants were pur-
posefully and voluntarily in Louisiana in the interest of their
business affairs.
In a strong dissent Judge Hood argued that the contacts
were insufficient because they were less than those found in
McGee. In his view, the only contacts defendants had with Lou-
isiana were the advertisements in the Louisiana paper and the
interview in the Louisiana motel; and, in both cases, defend-
ants' only connection with these activities was in paying a pro-
portionate part of the expense. Judge Hood did not consider
plaintiff's physical examination in New Orleans or his boarding
a plane there as contacts by defendants with the state of Lou-
isiana. Nor did he consider the fact that plaintiff's pay com-
menced in Louisiana on the day of his departure as compelling
the conclusion that any part of plaintiff's employment was per-
formed in Louisiana or that defendants had conducted any of
their business operations in Louisiana. Judge Hood felt that
the contacts were more in line with those of Denckla, and urged
that Texas, rather than Louisiana, was the proper forum for
plaintiff's suit. He found that, unlike McGee, the defendants'
contract with the plaintiff was not executed in Louisiana,23 the
plaintiff did not remain in Louisiana and continue to have busi-
22. 170 So. 2d at 518, 524.
23. For a discussion of the importance of this factor see Student Symposium,
Personal Jurisdiction, 26 LA. L. REV. 350, 376 (1966).
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ness relations with the defendant after the execution of the
contract, and the plaintiff would not be effectively denied his
right to have his claim adjudicated if Louisiana did not exercise
jurisdiction over it.
Judge Hood felt that Texas would be the proper forum
state because the contract was executed in Texas, the defend-
ants, he believed, maintained an office in Texas, and the con-
tract expressly provided that Texas workmen's compensation
law should apply. In balancing the inconveniences so as not to
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"
Judge Hood thought it would be as inconvenient for the defend-
ants to defend suit in Louisiana as for the plaintiff to prosecute
his claim in Texas, and therefore urged that the principles of
Pennoyer v. Neff 24 be applied to support Texas rather than Lou-
isiana jurisdiction.
The majority, however, were reluctant to turn plaintiff away
in the hope that Texas would afford him relief. They did
not share Judge Hood's view that the defendants maintained
an office in Texas, but argued that the only office defendants
maintained was in Kuwait. Further, they expressed the view
that as long as there was sufficient business contact to support
Louisiana jurisdiction, there was no need to examine the con-
venience of suit in any other state, whether next door or a "con-
tinent away." 2 They further reasoned that Texas might not
have a statute broad enough to permit it to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendants ;26 and that in a Texas suit, an
argument could be made that Louisiana was the proper forum
state.
Despite defendants' argument to the contrary, the majority
of the court found a "direct relationship" between the Louisiana
plaintiff's cause of action for his injury in Kuwait and the sub-
stantial business activity of foreign employers in Louisiana.
The cause of action was based upon the employment relation-
ship arising from the defendants' Louisiana activities: adver-
tising, interviewing, taking of applications, and having medical
examinations made - all in the successful attempt to hire Lou-
24. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Pennoyer stands for the principle that service of
process on a nonresident defendant must be effected within the forum state. See
Student Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction, 26 LA. L. REV. 350, 352, 389 (1966).
25. 170 So. 2d at 518, 525.
26. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2031a (1943).
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isiana workmen, including plaintiff. The majority distinguished
cases of lesser causal relation, 27 and observed that Louisiana
jurisdiction had been sustained on less direct relationship be-
tween the activity and the cause of action than was evident in
the instant case.28
The opposing judicial views are attributable to the differ-
ence of qualitative standards for the determination of sufficient
minimum contacts. If Judge Hood's yardstick is proper, the
instant case is an extreme application of the minimum contacts
rule, perhaps the extreme limit beyond which jurisdiction can-
not be maintained. Yet if Judge Tate's qualitative standards are
valid, the instant case was only a routine application of the
McGee standard. The fact that the Supreme Court which had
decided McGee and had decided Denckla dismissed the appeal
in the instant case for "want of a substantial federal question ' 2
and that Justice Harlan went so far as to urge that the appeal
be dismissed for "want of jurisdiction' 3 0 supports the conclu-
sion that the outer limits of the 1960 procedural statute have
yet to be defined.3 1
Billy J. Tauzin
WRONGFUL DEATH - HUSBAND'S RIGHT TO RECOVER THE Loss
OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS RESULTING FROM THE
DEATH OF His WIFE
The plaintiff sued on behalf of himself and his minor son in
federal district court under diversity of citizenship for the loss
27. See cases cited 170 So. 2d at 518, 527.
28. See Covington v. Southern Specialty Sales Co., 158 So. 2d 79 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1963), where the defendant nonresident manufacturer had purposely en-
tered Louisiana in connection with the sales of mowing machines, one of which
injured plaintiff. The defendant had a representative come to Louisiana every
four or five weeks to supply technical aid, information, and assistance in ordering
defendant's products. This activity was not directly connected with the sale to the
retailer of the specific machine which injured plaintiff after the retailer sold it.
Yet Louisiana was held to have jurisdiction where the cause of action was merely
indirectly connected with the minimal ,business activity.
29. 382 U.S. 16 (1965).
30. Ibid.
31. See LA. R.S. 13:3201-3207 (Supp. 1964). This statute, commonly called
the "Louisiana long-arm statute," enumerates in some detail the types of activity
sufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, and applies
to all nonresidents rather than to corporations alone as does LA. R.S. 13:3471(1)
(1950). Since the instant case involved a suit for workmen's compensation, which
is classified as an action exr contractu, it seems the case could have been disposed
of under the contractual provision of the "long-arm statute," LA. R.S. 13:3201(a)
(Supp. 1964).
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